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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID NELSON and LOY PEHRSON, et al, ) Supreme Court Docket #35543-2008 
) (Custer County Case  #CV 2005-91) 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendanis-Appellant ) 
I 
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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR CUSTER COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of t h e  Case. 
Appellants, all 63 of them, are consumers of water that Respondent Big 
Lost River Irrigation District (hereinafter "District") holds in trust for each of them, 
based on a judicial apportionment in 1936. Each consumer was apportioned a 
specific volume of water, as measured in the Mackay Dam. This water is 
delivered from the Mackay Dam to the consumers' various headgates and 
canals by transporting it down the natural channel of the Big Lost River. Many 
stretches or "reaches" of the river have significant conveyance loss, or what is 
referred to here as "shrink, as the river runs downstream more than 25 miles 
from Mackay to Arco, with the percentage of shrink generally increasing further 
downstream. 
Appellants are referred to here as the Mackay Users to distinguish them 
from the Intervenors, who are referred to as the Arco Users. The Mackay Users 
divert water from the natural river channei above what is known as the Blaine 
Diversion, a canal where the District historicaily diverted ali water from the river 
channel. 
The appeal of this declaratory judgment action arises from the fact that 
the district court declared the District has discretion to charge conveyance loss 
against the apportioned water of the Mackay Users, even for conveyance 
losses that occur downstream from, and are not related to, the delivery of their 
water. 
Appellants maintain the district court erred because the District's power is 
limited by both the 1936 decree apportioning water and by a 1994 Rule 
implemented by IDWR prescribing that conveyance losses in the natural 
channel be apportioned only to those whose water passes through a particular 
stretch, or reach, of the river. 
In sum, Appellants ask this Court to declare that the District's discretion to 
distribute water is limited and circumscribed by the 1936 decree, by the I994 
Rule, and by equity. In other words, it is an abuse of discretion to charge a 
Mackay User's apportioned amount of water for conveyance loss occurring 
near Arco. Yet, the District has attempted to do this under the appellation of 
"universal shrink", as it did both in 1994, which led to the 1994 Rule, and again 
beginning in 2005, which gave rise to the instant case. 
Appellants respectfully submit the decisions below are based on an 
erroneous understanding of the law, namely: (1) a misconception that the 
District had a statutory discretion to ignore IDWR's Rules requiring an accounting 
and application of conveyance loss by river reach; (2) a misconception that 
the District has discretion to ignore and undercut the 1936 judicial decree, 
which is res judicata, and which apportions the water "as measured in the 
reservoir" to each tract of land; and, (3) a failure to understand "universal 
shrink" is contrary to law because it takes a fixed, judicial apportionment of 
water from one consumer and gives it to another'further downriver.' 
II. Course of Proceedings Below 
The Mackay Users initiated this case against the District seeking to have 
the court declare the River-by-Reach Rule applicable and have the universal 
shrink scheme invalidated. The court initially granted a preliminary injunction 
" 
holding the Rule was clear and required conveyance losses to be allocated on 
a reach-by-reach basis. R. p. 28-33. The Arco Users intervened and a series of 
amended complaints followed, including to join IDWR as a party because its 
Rules were involved. R. p. 74-93. The District counterclaimed for a declaration 
that the universal shrink scheme was lawful and within the discretion of the 
District. R. p. 94-1 00. 
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. On November 17, 2006, 
the court issued its Opinion, Decision, and Order on Defendant Big Lost River 
1 The actuoi wroctice throuah which this is occom~lished aowears lo be to charue, or deduct, from the consumer's 
apportioned amount, an omount reflecting a portion of totdiconveyonce lossesin the entire iiver, instead of just the 
wortion used lo aet water to the consumer's diversion from !he river. in other words. instead of charaina bv river 
" V .  
segment or reaches, as IDWR's rules require. Mockoy Users are charged based on oil losses in the entire length of the 
river. 
Irrigation Districf's Mofion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R.  p. 145-158. The court held that IDWR's River-by-Reach 
Rule (Rule 40.03) requires the watermaster to charge conveyance loss against 
storage water to administer the natural flow in the River, but the District still has 
unfettered discretion to manage conveyance loss amongst its consumers 
under discretion allocated through ldaho Code §43-304. In short, the court 
held that, while IDWR lhas authority under ldaho Code $42-603 to promulgate 
rules regarding water in the natural channel, that the statute conflicted with the 
discretion to distribute water among consumers given to the District by ldaho 
Code 343-304. R.  p. 156. The court resolved what it considered to be a conflict 
in these statutes by holding that IDWR has jurisdiction of water in ihe river 
channel until it is delivered to the storage water to the Irrigation Districts 
"headgate", but that the Disirict had authority for water distribution from that 
point. Id, In sum, the court held the District had discretion to administer water 
as between its consumers. R. p. 156-1 57. 
The Mackay Users moved for reconsideration (R. p. 159-1 61 ) ,  but the 
court reconfirmed its prior holding by order dated March 23,2007. R. P. 177- 
183. 
The Mackay Users instituted an appeal to this Court. R. p.  186-187. After 
they hired new counsel, the parties stipulafed to the dismissal of that appeal 
because it was interlocutory and had not been properly certified under I.R.C.P. 
54 (b), as the District's claim that it be allowed to implement universal shrink had 
not been decided. 
After remand, on February 20, 2008, the court entered another Order, 
Judgment, and Decree, based on a stipulation of the District and Intervenors 
(but not the Mackay Users), requiring that "universal shrink be used to allocate 
river losses of storage water among the District consumers. RII. p. 7-13. 
The Mackay Users responded with motions to enlarge time and for 
reconsideration of each of the court's orders, pointing out that the district court 
had not considered several important laws, including: I.C. $42- 801 which 
requires IDWR to track storage water put into and taken out of the river on a 
person-by-person basis; I.C. 943-1503 which specifies there can be no conflict in 
the law, as ihe court had previously ruled, because the irrigation district laws of 
Title 43 (including I.C. 943-304) shall not be construed " . . . as repealing or in any 
way modifying the provisions of any other act relating to the subject of irrigation 
water or water distribution". 2 Rll. D. 14-21, 145-1 60. 
2 I t  is impoi.iaiii to note each of the slatiites inieniioned were ii i e f kc t  iii siibstaoiially the salnc forb13 belb~e the I936  judicial apportioiimeiil. Th i s  
wbeii waici was apyoiiioned in il lc reservoir, i t  was clearly iindcrsiood the conveyance losses woilld be accoiiiiicd for according to ihcse staiiitcs. 
On June 8, 2008, the court heard argument on Plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration and the other parties' objections regarding timeliness. It ruled 
that it did have discretion to reconsider and denied the timeliness obiections. 
Tr. p. 374, In. 20 - p. 375, In. 2. It denied reconsideration because it did not 
believe the I936 decree addressed conveyance loss and it believed the 
District had the power to change its mind with respect to how shrink was 
allocated, even though distribution on a reach basis had occurred for a long 
time. Tr. p. 377, In. 6 - p. 379, In. 21 
This appeal timely followed that decision 
Ill. Statement of Facts 
A. In 1935 and 1936, an amount of water, measured in the reservoir, 
was judicially apportioned to each individual user. 
The 1936 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provide the following: 
The Findings state: 
... in order to prevent an inequitable distribution to the land ... [the 
Board] found, determined and declared certain factors and 
consideration to be an integral part of said ... apportionment of 
benefits and to be basic and binding regulations which would 
govern distribution of water ... and this Court does find, determine 
and declare as follows: 
That the following factors and considerations are hereby found, 
determined, and declared to be an integral part of said 
apportionment and assessment of benefits, to-wit:- 
RII. p. 
... this Court does find and determine that certain [lands] require 
... a supplemental storage water right ...  from the reservoir and 
irrigation works proposed to be acquired ... as shown in the 
following table: 
Supplemental Requirement in Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir 
Decreed Priority f S u p p i e m e n i a i  
/ In Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir 















































Thus, it is clear the voters, the Board and the Court ail knew, considered 
and decided to address "inequitable distribution" as "an integral pari" of the 
decree, and decided, rightly or wrongly, the solution was to apportion and 
measure in the reservoir: 
[the Big Lost River Irrigation District] ... Board of Directors in order to 
prevent an inequitable distribution to the lands within the district of 
the supplemental water ... found, determined, and declared 
certain factors and considerations to be an integral part of said 
assessment and apportionment of benefits and to be basic and 
binding regulations which would govern the distribution of water so 
acquired. ... and this Court does find, determine and declare as 
follows:- 
That ... this Court does find from a study of the records of the flows 
of The Big Lost River and its tributaries ... [on an average year the 
reservoir yields storage not of less than] 24,500 acre feet storage 
measured in said reservoir, and that those lands within said district 
to which have been apportioned certain benefits designated 
"Amount Storage Water Assessmeni" are benefited by the 
allotment of storage water ... 
It is hereby further found and determined by this Court that storage 
water is hereby allotted to those lands against which "Storage 
Water Assessment" benefits have been apportioned according to 
said list and apportionment of benefits, and only such lands shall 
be entitled to storage water. 
RII. p. 51-52. 
And in any year when the water supply belonging to the district 
and available for storage shall be more or less than the 24,500 
acre feet, then the respective landowners entitled to storage 
water shail be entitled to the available stored waters on the same 
basis and in the same proportion as shown to be a supplemental 
requirement in acre feet for the several ciasses of land according 
to the above table. 
Later in the conclusions (Rll. p. 65-68) [Exhibit A, XI, pp. 36,39), the court 
concluded that the petitioners were entitled to a judgment and decree of the 
court ratifying and approving and confirming the proceedings taken by the 
Board and: 
... ali proceedings in co~iriection with the assessment and 
apportionment of benefits by reason of carrying out of such plan ... 
a copy of the list of said assessment and apportioriment of benefits 
being on file herein marked "Petitioners' Exhibit 1 3 .  
in the last paragraph of the Fndings and Conclusions, any doubt about the 
finality of the proceedings is extinguished by the court's determination: 
. . . and all proceedings had and taken by said District as set forth 
and described in petitioners' petition on file herein, as legal, valid 
and binding upon said District and upon all the lands included 
therein and affected thereby. ... Let judgment and decree be 
entered accordingly. Dated this 25th day of January, 1936. 
RII .  p. 69. (Exhibit A, p. 40) 
Those findings and conclusions resulted in Exhibit B, the Judgment and 
Decree of the same date. Rll. p. 70-84. It confirms the apportionment to each 
consumer. it, in Section Vl (page lo), acknowledged the prior proceedings, 
the apportionments of benefits, and assessments and notes that they were all 
duly accomplished "in the proper manner and order and in full and strict 
compliance with the statutes and laws of the State of Idaho applicable 
thereto, they are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed." Rll. p. 79-80. 
In Section IX (page 11-12), the court determined that the respective 
amounts of apportionment for the various tracts and subdivisions of lands, 
including the special factors and considerations entering into the 
apportionment and the basic rules and regulations governing the use and 
distribution of water upon those lands, are "hereby ratified, approved and 
confirmed." Rll. p. 81. 
And in the final section, Section Xlll (p. 13), the court adjudicates each 
and every act in the proceedings with respect to the things described in 
Petitioners' Petition to be lawfully and properly accomplished, and to be "valid 
and binding upon said District and all lands included therein and affected 
thereby; and each and every of the said acts and proceedings are hereby 
ratified, approved and confirmed". Rll. p. 83 
B. In 1994, through a process of negotiated rulemaking in which the 
District participated, IDWR adopted a Rule for administering water 
that required water losses in the river channel below the Mackay 
Dam be accounted for on a reach-by-reach basis and rejected 
the concept of "universal shrink. 
During the early stages of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, the Big Lost 
River Valley was selected as one of the "test basins" because significant issues 
had arisen concerning water rights and how to administer the reservoir. R.  p 
142. Consequently, pursuant to the SRBA Court orders an interim administration, 
David Shaw, Bureau Chief for IDWR, implemented negotiated rulemaking 
which the District attended and participated in. Id. Rule 40.03.b (IDAPA 
37.03.1 2.40.03.b). Id. The Rule was adopted to preserve what the participants 
all considered the equitable distribution of storage water in Water District 34 
This was done in part to specifically address the concerns of individual water 
right holders about how delivery losses would be applied to storage water. Id. 
It was intended to insure the storage water would not be subject to universal 
shrink, but would be allocated on the shrink-by-reach formula set forth in the 
Rule. id. 
The final Rule reads as follows: 
Conveyance losses in the natural channel shall be proportioned by 
the watermaster between natural flow and impounded water. The 
proportioning shall be done on a river reach basis. Impounded 
water flowing through a river.reach that does not have a 
conveyance loss will not be assessed a loss for that reach. The 
impounded water flowing through any river reach that does have 
a conveyance loss will be assessed and a proportionate share of 
the loss for each losing reach through which the impounded river 
flows. To avoid an iterative accounting procedure, impounded 
water conveyance loss from the previous day shall be assessed on 
the current day. 
This Rule, which is consistent with the 1936 decree and the admitted 
historic practice effectively resolved the disputes until the District made another 
attempt at implementing universal shrink in 2005. 
C. The Big Lost River Irrigation District adopted bylaws and policies, as 
late as 2004, confirming each individual user has the right to 
apportioned water under the 1936 decree. 
The current version of the District's own Bylaws provides as follows: 
Sec. 5. Any water consumer who has any water right under the 
Assessment and Apportionment of Benefits under the District's bond 
issue voted May 18, 1935, and approved and confirmed by the 
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in 
and for the County of Custer, on January 6, 1936, and thereafter 
approved by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall have the 
right to any water belonging to him by such storage right or direct 
flow under said Assessment and Apportionment of Benefits, in the 
District's Reservoir, [but such water consumer shall be required first 
io give forty-eight (48) hours notice to the general manager of the 
district or to the office of the district of his intention to store said 
water, and such water consumer shall likewise give forty-eight (48) 
hours notice to the general manager or to the office of the district 
of his desire again to use water]. (This paragraph was deleted 
from bylaws June 2, 1964.) (Emphasis added.) 
Sec. 7. The Board of Directors shall have power to reduce the 
quantity of storage water demanded by any consumer in case of 
a shortage in the Mackay Reservoir, or by reason of breakage in 
the banks of canals, headgates or dams, whereupon it shall be the 
duty of the Board of Directors to apportion the water available pro 
rata among all consumers. 
Rll. p. 99. (Exhibit C, Article Vll, p.12.) 
The District has argued that the first paragraph above was deleted, but 
Appellants maintain only the bracketed portion was, as is consistent with all of 
the other deletions through the Bylaws 
D. "Universal shrink, the central issue in this case, is an accounting 
method that effectively reapportions water to annul the amount 
judicially apportioned to each individual user. 
There is no dispute about what "universal shrink is. But for the sake of 
clarity it is important that the Court understand not only what it is, but what it is 
not. First, universal shrink only applies to water being transported from the 
reservoir through the naiural river channel of the Big Lost River. Once judicially 
apportioned storage water is diverted from the natural river channel into 
canals and ditches, it falls outside the universal shrink scheme. The District 
admits that, once water is diverted into a canal, conveyance losses from the 
canal are charged only to those who use water from the canal 
Second, it is important to understand that the universal shrink scheme 
applies only to the apportioned storage water. Those who have water rights 
diverted directly from the river, and not through storage, are not charged a 
conveyance loss in the channel below the reservoir. This is obviously because 
they are entitled to have their water diverted from the river at their point of 
diversion, without regard to conveyance losses because such losses do no1 
come into play with respect to those natural flow rights until they are diverted 
out of the river. Thus, to suggest the river-by-reach formula is designed to apply 
to flow rights and not to storage rights ignores the fundamental attributes of the 
flow rights. As is argued below, the universal shrink scheme is nothing more 
than an attempt to "reapportion" the storage water in a manner inconsistent 
with the judicial apportionment in the reservoir. 
Finally, it is also undisputed the Mackay Users lose part of their 
apportioned water when the universal shrink scheme is implemented, contrary 
to their constitutional right to use water that has been dedicated to their land. 
See R. p. 87 (Exhibit B to the 2nd amended complaint), showing the actual 
shrink under the river-by-reach accounting versus the universal shrink 
accounting. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I .  Did the district court err in holding that the Big Lost River Irrigation 
District has unfettered discretion to distribuie apportioned water 
below the Mackay Dam without regard to the 1936 judicial 
apportionment? 
11. Did the district court further err by judicially decreeing that the 
universal shrink scheme, which causes individual users to lose 
apportioned water so that other users can benefit, is lawful and to 
be applied without reference to limitations in the 1936 decree and 
the 1994 Rule? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellants Nelson, et al., request costs and attorney fees on appeal 
under I.A.R. 40 and 41 and I.C. 3 12-1 17. The costs should be awarded as a 
matter of right under the Appellate Rules. The attorney fees should be 
awarded under I.C. $12-1 17 against the District because it acted without 
reasonable basis in fact or law by intentionally and erroneously designing a 
scheme to deprive the Mackay Users, people to whom it owes a duty as 
trustee, of water judicially apportioned to them and constitutionally protected 
through the dedication of that water to their properties. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
in reviewing the summary judgment motions this Court employs the same 
standard used by the district court. Sprinkler irrigation Co., lnc. v. John Deere 
Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 695, 85 P.3d 667, 671 (2004). Judgment is 
appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and other 
materials on file show no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
ARGUMENT 
The Court erred in holding the District has unfettered discretion to ignore the 
previous judicial allocation of benefits, including the apportionment of water. 
To properiy analyze the claims in this case, one must first recognize the 
legal standards that circumscribe the discretion statutorily allocated to the 
courts and to an irrigation district. When dealing with matters of discretion, the 
court must decide: ( I )  what legal discretion the district has: (2) whether the 
district has acfed within the outer bounds of that discretion and consisieni with 
legal standards; and, (3) whether the district's decision to seek and obtain a 
judicial decree mandating "universal shrink" falls within the district's discretion 
and exercise of reason. See, Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. ldaho Power 
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
In this case, the analysis begins with acknowledgment the District has 
some discretion to distribute water pursuant to I.C. 543-304. However, 
Appellants contend the District acted beyond the bounds of that discretion by 
ignoring the 1936 decree, by attempting to circumvent the conveyance loss 
rule, and by failing to exercise a reasonable and equitable distribution plan. 
1. Irrigation District Law limits the District's power by compelling it to abide 
by the 1936 decree. 
Irrigation districts are creatures of statute. Their quasi-public corporate 
status confers on them only such powers as given by statute or necessarily 
implied therefrom. Yaden v. Gem lrrigation District, 37 ldaho 300, 21 6 P. 250 
(1923). The power of directors and officers is limited by the express and implied 
provisions of statutes, and any actions in excess of the statutory provisions are 
ultra vires. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District v. Gilmore, 53 ldaho 377, 23 
P.2d 720 ( 1  9331. 
To date, neither the lower court nor the parties have considered the 
express, statutory limitations that follow from the declaration that the use of 
water is a public use to be regulated and controlled in the manner prescribed 
by law. Nampa and Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Barclay, 47 P.2d, 91 6, 921 (ldaho, 
1935). [The consumers have rights as distributees of the water under Sections 4 
and 5, ArI. 15, of the Constituiion.} 
Furthermore, to avoid arbitrary or capricious exercise of an irrigation 
district's powers under I.C. 843-406, the benefits each landholder will receive, 
and the corresponding assessments he will pay, must be fixed by judicial 
decree when bonding is approved. I.C. 843-406. 
When a district is created and when it uses bonds to acquire its water 
rights and works, a court must decide and decree what benefits and what 
costs in proportion to those specific benefits will be apportioned equitably to 
each of the parcels of land which will receive the water. This process is spelled 
out in Title 43, Chapter 4, beginning with the election to authorize issuance of 
bonds and the Board initially apportioning costs and benefits. I.C. 343-404. The 
Board must then hold hearings io apportion the benefits to the tracts of land 
and determine whether benefits and assessmenis will be just and equitable. 
I.C. §43-405. Then, a district court must confirm the assessments and 
apportionments are just and equitable. I.C. 943-406. 
The decree of confirmation fixes the apportionment and is conclusive as 
to all matters considered in the proceedings. American Falis Reservoir District v. 
Phraii, 39 Idaho 105, 130, 228 P. 236 (1924). By specific statutory prohibition, any 
reopening of the case "shall not be considered as authorizing any rehearing of 
the matter theretofore heard and decided". I.C. 943-406. 
It is significant to protecting a consumer's rights that a court, and not the 
board, is assigned the duty of ratifying, approving and confirming the 
assessments, lists, apportionments and distributions. If the court finds any matter 
unjust or erroneous, "the same [petition] shall not be returned to said board, but 
the court shall proceed to correct the same so as to conform to this title and 
the rights of all parties in the premises ... " I.C. 343-408. Under this provision, the 
confirming court clearly has the power to make adjustments to any 
apportionment of benefits and does not act merely in the capacity of a rubber 
stamp. Haga v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, 38 ldaho 333, 221 P. 147 
(1923). This judicial determination is res judicata and cannot be collaterally 
attacked. Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 ldaho 21 7, 101 P. 81 
( 1  908); Smith v. Progressive Irrigation District, 28 ldaho 81 2, 156 P. 1 133 ( 1  9 16); 
see also, Russell v. Irish, 20 ldaho 194, 118 P. 501 (191 1 ) .  
In short, from before ldaho became a state until the present, ldaho has 
statutorily mandated that a landholder's proportion of benefits and costs be 
equitably fixed by a court at ihe time a district is being created or bonds issue. 
Furthermore, once fixed by judicial adjudication, a district has no discretion to 
change them. 
To bond the lands of the settlers within a district to acquire the right to the 
use of water and then to deprive them of such right in order that it may be 
furnished to lands without the district would clearly be taking property of the 
landowners within the district without due process of iaw. Yaden v. Gem 
Irrigation District, 37 ldaho 300, 309 (1923). To circumvent the apportionmenl 
that was fixed during the 1936 bonding process through universal shrink has the 
same affect. It takes an apportionment of water to give it to others within a 
district. 
In this case, the benefits were adjudicated in 1936 and specifically 
apportioned so that each user's benefit would be a volume of water 
"measured in the reservoir". 
The Findings state: 
... in order to prevent an inequitable distribution to the land ... [the 
Board] found, determined and declared certain factors and 
consideration to be an integral part of said ... apportionment of 
benefits and to be basic and binding regulations which would 
govern distribution of water ... and this Court does find, determine 
and declare as follows: 
That the following factors and considerations are hereby found, 
determined, and declared to be an integral part of said 
apportionment and assessment of benefits, to-wit:- 
... this Court does find and determine that certain [lands] require 
... a supplemental storage water right ... from the reservoir and 
irrigation works proposed to be acquired ... as shown in the 
following table: 
Supplemental Requirement in Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir 
Decreed Priority 
Before June,] 884 
June, I884 
July, 1884 













































considered and decided to address "inequitable distribution" as "an integral 
part" of the decree, and decided, rightly or wrongly, the solution was to 
apportion and measure in the Reservoir. Now the District wants to measure at 
the headgates, numerous miles below the Reservoir. They label this "universal 
shrink," this scheme of effectively forcing Mackay Users to give water 
apportioned to them to the Arco Users for conveyance losses downstream of 
the Mackay Users. 
The label does not change the fact that universal shrink is ~iotliing more 
than a reapportionment. A reapportionment contrary to the doctrine of res 
judicata and the clause in I.C. 943-406 that provides no matter considered in 
the initial case apportioning benefits may be reheard. American Falls Reservoir 
District v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 130, 228 Pac. 2236 (1924). (The decree that confirms 
and fixes the apportionment of benefits is conclusive as to all matters 
considered in the proceedings). 
Neither the Intervenors, the District, nor the Court, has the power or 
discretion to "equitably reapportion." 
ii. The District Court's Summary Judgment Order Fails to Construe the 
Statutes in Pari Materia. 
The Court may not enter an illegal order, denying Appellants the benefits 
previously apportioned to them per court decree. Nor can the lower court's 
order withstand scrutiny when all of the pertinent statutes are considered 
A. This lower court's ruling erroneously concludes and effectively 
holds the District has ']urisdictionfl to reapportion. 
The district court has decided, when IDWR promulgated the rules, the 
rules were directed to apply only to the watermaster under authority from 1.C 
342-603, and not to the District. However, Appellants submit the district court 
did not dig deep enough in the statutes when it stated, under I.C. 343-304, the 
Board has authority and discretion to allocate water in the river below the dam, 
Contrary to this ruling, the statutes specify there can be no "conflict" between 
IDWR's jurisdiction to administer by rule and the District's jurisdiction to allocate 
water amongst its users under Title 43. The duties over water within the river 
channel, or what the rules refer to as "reaches," is assigned to IDWR. I.C. $42- 
801. (A reservoir owner must give IDWR an accounting of the specific amount 
being discharged into the river and the persons and ditches to whom it will be 
conveyed.) 
Furthermore, the function assigned to IDWR does not conflict in any way 
with the District's statutory powers. In fact, the statutory scheme states IDWR's 
authority to administer the reaches is not in any way diminished by irrigation 
district law, i.e., Title 43. 
I.C. $43-1 503 specifically provides: 
None of the provisions of this title [43j shall be construed as 
repealing or in anywise modifying the provisions of any other act 
relating to the subject of the irrigation or water distribution. 
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to authorize any 
person or persons to divert the waters of any river, creek, stream, 
canal or ditch from its channel, to the detriment of any person or 
persons having any interest in such river, creek, stream, canal or 
ditch, or the water therein, unless previous compensation be 
ascertained and paid therefor, under the laws of this state 
authorizing the taking of private property for public uses. 
B. The Practice Of Universal Shrink Is Contrary To The Apportionment 
Of Water, As Measured in The Reservoir, IDWR's Duty to Administer, 
and the "River by Reaches" Rule. 
Using an example helps to illustrate how the universal shrink concept of 
water distribution is contrary to the apportionment of benefits, other laws and 
Rule 40. In this example, Mr. Mackay and Mr. Arco are persons owning land to 
which the benefits were apportioned, as measured in the reservoir, in 1936. Mr. 
Mackay's land is slightly below the reservoir on the first "river reach". Mr. Arco's 
land is 20 miles below the reservoir, closer to the town of Arco. 
Mr. Mackay and Mr. Arco were each apportioned 10 acre feet, as 
measured in the reservoir. When Mr. Mackay's 10 acre feet are delivered, one 
acre foot is lost through conveyance in the river below the reservoir. When Mr. 
Arco's 10 acre feet are delivered, 5 acre feet are lost in conveyance in the river 
below the reservoir. 
If universal shrink is applied, Mr. Mackay would not receive 9 acre feet at 
his headgate when he calls for his 10 acre feet of water. Instead, if Mr. Arco 
and Mr. Mackay are each calling for their 10 acre feet of water, Mr. Mackay 
would only realize 7 acre feet instead of 9. (20 acre feet less total conveyance 
loss of six acre feet, divided by two equals three acre feet of loss apportioned 
to Mr. Mackay). 
Such a scheme is contrary to law and takes Mr. Mackay's rights that have 
been fixed since 1936, by vote, petition, decree and now IDWR's Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must effectuate prior decrees and reject the opponent's 
attempts to reapportion rights under some ill-defined notions of equity, called 
universal shrink. 
In sum, while a district has some discretion to equitably distribute water 
among its consumers, the District's discretion is limited to distribution by the 
judicially fixed parameters established when the District purchased the system 
through bonding. Neither the District nor this Court may ignore those 
parameters. In this case, the parameters have been disregarded, both in terms 
of IDWR's unitary obligation to control the distribution of water, and in terms of 
the legal prohibitions imposed on the District's discretion to change and ignore 
the judicial apportionment of benefits to the consumers. 
Furthermore, there is no legal split in authority to decide how to account 
for water lost in the riverbed. IDWR's authority is not diminished or in conflict 
with the District's laws of Title 43. I.C. 343-1 503 specifically forbids such a conflict 
and legislatively mandates that this Court apply IDWR's Rule to all users of the 
river who convey water in it. 
The outer boundaries of the District's and this Court's discretion are fixed 
by the 1936 decree and statute, and cannot be altered. Under I.C. 543-406 the 
allotment of water to each consumer, as measured in the Reservoir, was 
permanently established as a benefit to each consumer. As the "trustee" of 
these allotments, the District must protect each for the specific consumer, not 
dilute them. See, Jensen v. Boise-Kuna Irr. Dist., 75 Idaho 133, 141, 26 P.2d 755, 
760 (1954). (Under I.C. $43-316, a district holds the water in trust for its 
consumers.) 
Therefore, the Court is respectfully requested to reverse the decisions 
below to comply with the law, as described above 
DATED this day of January, 2009. 
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